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Abstract  
 
China‘s strong economic performance and its financial development outcomes are extremely 
difficult to reconcile with the dominant verdict that its financial system is seriously inefficient. 
Using an evolutionary perspective as a metaphor, this essay offered suggestions that adaptive 
efficiency criteria may help solve the apparent puzzle. An adaptive efficiency criterion offers 
conceptual as well as methodological approaches to resolving this puzzle and contradiction. 
The essay‘s discussions reveal that much of what critics cite as intermediation inefficiencies 
–non performing loans, directed credit allocation– are, in fact, a dissipative energy generating 
required spillovers fuelling the entire system. From this perspective, the essay argues that the 
relevant evaluation criterion for the Chinese financial system would be ―adaptive efficiency‖, 
instead of the conventional allocative one. This arises since China is an emerging economic 
system characterized primarily by state-owned financial institutions and whose goals are 
developmental. 
 
 
Keywords: Financial Development, China, Adaptive Efficiency, Co-evolutionary Perspective 
 
Note: The paper should be considered in progress and is made public to stimulate further discussion and 
critical comments. Comments are highly appreciated and should be addressed directly to the author 
(Maswana[*]econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp), [*]=@. 
 2 
1. Introduction 
The endogenous growth literature provides ample evidence that financial development is a 
major determinant of economic growth. Theory links these two factors based on the argument 
that by reducing information, transaction, and monitoring costs, a well-developed financial 
system performs several critical functions to enhance intermediation efficiency. Ultimately, 
enhanced financial intermediation efficiency causes economic growth (for further see Pagano, 
1993). It thus follows that economic growth rarely (if ever) occurs without a well-functioning 
financial system (see McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; King & Levine, 1993; Levine et al. 2000). 
In other words, if the financial system distorts the allocation of funds in the presence of 
financial repression, economic growth cannot be sustained and financial depth (as defined by 
Shaw, 1973) remains deficient.  
However, the above theoretical prediction does not match the empirical facts about the 
finance–growth nexus in transition economies, especially those undergoing tremendous 
structural change, such as China. In the latter case, several scholars (i.e. Lardy, 1998) have 
drawn attention to the inefficiencies of China‘s banking system, including directed credit 
allocation and nonperforming loans among others. Whereas this inference contains a kernel of 
truth, the strong economic performance occurring over the last two decades in China (its real 
GDP growth averaged nine percent) is extremely difficult to reconcile with the standard view 
that its financial system grossly distorts the optimal allocation of loanable funds and its financial 
sector is seriously inefficient. Confronted with such inconsistency, which seemingly contradicts 
conventional wisdom, it must be asked how sense can be made of an inefficient financial system 
successfully supporting sustained economic growth. That is, are efficiency criteria truly relevant 
in a transitional economic system?  
The key to answer this question and begin reconciling the financial system efficiency with 
economic growth performance in China is the changing perspective into a co-evolutionary 
frame on the one hand and the recognition that much of what critics cite as intermediation 
inefficiencies –non performing loans, directed credit allocation– are, in fact, a dissipative energy 
generating the required spillovers that fuel the entire system, in the other hand. From this 
perspective, the essay argues that applying the market criterion of allocative efficiency to a 
transition economy like China seems misleading; rather, the most relevant criterion for judging 
China‘s financial system would be ―adaptive efficiency.‖ 
Resorting to adaptive efficiency criterion helps in achieving the essay‘s ultimate goal of 
providing a consistent conceptual interpretation of theoretical and empirical studies on Chinese 
financial development, which goal is necessarily speculative. Although a comprehensive review 
of the efficiency of China‘s financial system is beyond the scope of this essay, it does however 
contributes to the hotly debate on the reliability of the Chinese financial system. Given the 
growing global status of China as a net creditor, the present debate is of considerable interest for 
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analytical reasons as well as for understanding the implications of China‘s ongoing financial 
reforms on the safeguard of the global financial stability. 
To provide background for the discussion, the next section presents selected institutional 
facts about Chinese financial development and the progress accomplished after 1978. The third 
section then provides alternative interpretations and angles for assessing the Chinese financial 
system‘s performance. At the close, the essay discusses the practical implications of adaptive 
efficiency view for future research. 
2. Overview of the Chinese financial development  
To understand the Chinese financial system, it is important first to review Chinese financial 
development in terms of institutions and development performance. This review focuses on the 
banking sector because it accounts for most financial activities in China. 
2.1. Institutional setting 
From its origins as a fiscal agent for domestic resource allocation in the central planning 
context, China‘s financial structure has been experiencing tremendous changes. Since adoption 
of the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, the Chinese financial system has not only 
accommodated banking institutions but has also introduced stock and market institutions as 
regulatory bodies, which has played an important role in its subsequent development.  
A. The banking sector 
China‘s financial system is largely dominated by the banking industry. According to the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), at the end of 2006, the total assets of China's 
banking industry rose 17.3 percent to 43.9 trillion yuan (5.48 trillion U.S. dollars). Besides 
nonbank financial institutions, there are four types of banks in China: state-owned banks 
(hereafter SOBs), commercial banks, credit cooperatives, and foreign banks.  
A.1. State-owned banks: These comprise both state-owned commercial banks and policy banks. 
The banking sector is heavily concentrated around the Big Four state-owned banks, which 
represent 60–70 percent of the domestic banking business measured in terms of total assets:  
 The Bank of China (traditionally responsible for foreign exchange activity and the 
financing of imports and exports);  
 The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC, originally specialized in lending to 
the industrial sector);  
 The China Construction Bank (CCB, traditionally focused on financing infrastructure 
development); and  
 The Agricultural Bank of China (ABC, traditionally focused on agricultural lending and 
rural development).  
At the end of 2001, these banks had a 62 percent share of the savings and lending business and 
an 80 percent share of the payments business; and by the end of 2006, they had approximately 
80,000 branches nationwide.   
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In 1994, during banking reform, Chinese authorities established three policy banks to 
relieve the Big Four of their state-directed lending role (Hansakul, 2004): 
 The Agricultural Development Bank of China, which primarily took over the policy 
lending role from the ABC. 
 The China Development Bank, which primarily took over the policy lending role from 
the CCB and to a certain extent from the ICBC. 
 The Export-Import Bank of China, which primarily took over the policy lending role 
from the BOC, particularly the trade financing function. 
A.2. Commercial banks: Currently, 120 commercial banks, whose equity ownership is 
distributed among both state and private investors, account for 18 percent of the banking 
sector‘s assets (Hansakul, 2004). These commercial banks are divided into two subgroups: 
 Shareholding or joint-stock commercial banks, which are incorporated as joint-stock 
limited companies under the People‘s Republic of China‘s Company Law; and  
 City commercial banks, constructed on the basis of the traditional urban credit 
cooperative, which have become commercial banks with stock-holding features. In 
2004, there were 114 city commercial banks, representing approximately four percent of 
the domestic banking business.  
A.3. Credit cooperatives: The cooperatives typically provide credit to small and medium-sized 
enterprises and individuals. Urban credit cooperatives (about 3,200) have approximately five 
percent of the domestic banking business (Hansakul, 2004), while numerous (about 41,500) 
rural credit cooperatives and other small institutions have approximately nine percent (Ligang, 
2001). 
A.4. Foreign banks: In 2006, these accounted for only around two percent of total 
banking-sector assets in contrast to the total assets of foreign banks in China, which, according 
to the Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), hit $153.9 billion by the end of October 2007, 
up 41 percent from the same month the previous year. 
A.5. Nonbank financial institutions: There are three main types of nonbank financial 
institutions—trust and investment companies (TICs), finance companies, and leasing companies. 
Together they account for around 1 percent of the banking sector‘s total assets.  
A.6. Other entities: This category includes securities companies, asset management companies, 
and insurance companies. The insurance industry has been established for a longer period but is 
still dominated by the state-owned People‘s Insurance Company of China (PICC) Group.  
B. Stock, bond, and other markets 
Besides its large banking sector, China has seen the development of stock and bond markets, 
as well as futures markets (Hansakul, 2004). 
B.1. Stock market: In Mainland China, two stock exchanges—one in Shanghai (SHSE), the 
other in Shenzen (SZSE)—provide firms with additional fund-raising sources. In 2007, the 
combined market capitalization of the Shanghai and Shenzen stock markets stood at 21.147 
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trillion RMB, passing the 2006 GDP level of 21.087 trillion RMB (Zhixin, 2007). In 2005, stock 
markets provided about five percent of official corporate financing. One distinctive feature of 
the Chinese equity market is its division into two segments, one restricted to domestic Chinese 
investors, the other open to foreigners. The first segment consists of A shares, launched in 1990, 
which are common stock issued by mainland PRC companies, subscribed and traded in RMB, 
listed on mainland stock exchanges, and reserved for trading by PRC citizens. The second 
segment is partly made up of B shares, launched in 1992, which are issued by mainland PRC 
companies, traded in foreign currencies, listed on mainland stock exchanges, and prior to 
February 19, 2001, were restricted to foreign investors. This segment also includes H shares, 
shares of mainland PRC companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  
B.2. Bond market: China‘s bond market is actually composed of three markets: the interbank 
bond market, the exchange market, and the bank over-the-counter market. It is the second 
largest domestic bond market in non-Japan Asia after South Korea‘s, with total outstanding 
issuance at around 34 percent of the GDP (2002). 
C. Regulatory bodies 
 Numerous regulatory bodies oversee these financial institutions, and China‘s economic and 
financial policies are currently made by separate agencies. Monetary policy and the payment 
system is the responsibility of the PBOC, which sets deposit and lending rate bands, as well as 
reserve requirement ratios. Likewise, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
oversees the securities and futures market; the CIRC regulates the insurance industry; the CBRC 
(China Banking Regulatory Commission) regulates the banking institutions, the 
asset-management firms, trust and investment companies, and other depositary financial 
institutions; and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) sets 
macroeconomic policies for the country, including the annual quota of corporate bond issues (Ji, 
2006). 
In sum, alongside China‘s economic growth, its financial sector, in its entire configuration, 
has made substantial progress over the last three decades.  
2.2. Financial Progress since 1978 
Financial development is broadly defined here to include improvements in the level of 
financial activity, the stability of the banking sector, and the quality of resource allocation as 
reflected in real sector performance (i.e., growth). Since the early 1980s, financial depth in 
China has been impressive, with the real monetary balance expanding at a rate faster than the 
real economy. For instance, the ratio of money (broadly defined, M2) as a ratio of GDP 
increased from 24 percent in 1978 to 182 percent in 2004. Compared to those of a similar 
transition economy like Russia, changes in China‘s financial system have been remarkable. 
Whereas Russia shrank from a 1990 M2/GDP ratio of 70 percent to 21 percent in 1995 and a 
2004 rate of 29 percent that equals the Chinese level in 1980 (IMF, 2004), China moved from a 
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1990 M2/GDP ratio of 71 percent to 103 percent in 1995 and 182 percent in 2004. Such a high 
level of financial depth places China among the most advanced economies.  
This striking financial deepening is primarily due to two factors: the monetization of the 
economy and the expansion of household financial savings. In 2001, household deposits 
accounted for 77.9 percent of quasi-money and 47.2 percent of broad money (Chen, 2003). 
Indeed, according to Bernstam and Rabushka (2004), the ratio of nontransaction deposits 
(savings and time deposits) increased sharply from 38 percent in 1985 to 52 percent in 1991 and 
58 percent in 2003. The pooled savings have been primarily channeled into bank loans which 
represent the major financing mechanism of economic activities in China. Bank loans accounted 
for over 85% of total funds raised by the real sector in 2006 (PBC, 2006). Meanwhile, the share 
of corporate bonds accounted for six percent in 2006.  
Although bank loans remain the dominant source of funding for Chinese companies, loan 
structures have moved away from heavy reliance on bank loan and state budget. Increasingly, 
domestic loans, taking the place of state budget appropriations, have become the primary 
external source for financing capital investments. Whereas in 1981, state budgetary 
appropriation financed 28.1 percent of total fixed asset investment (Chen, 2003), by the 
mid-2000s, the state budget had lost its importance, contributing only about ten percent of 
state-owned companies‘ total funding (Allen et al., 2007). Together with this change in the 
means of external finance, the growth in loan size has also shifted from short-term to 
long-term loans (Allen et al., 2005). 
At the same time, the previously nonexistent insurance market has been growing, although 
it still remains small in comparison to other Asian economies (South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Singapore), especially in terms of the ratio of total assets managed by insurance companies to 
GDP. At the end of 2006, the total assets managed were still less than ten percent of GDP 
compared to over 30 percent for the above Asian economies (Allen et al., 2005). Moreover, 
despite the fast growth of insurance coverage and premium income, by the end of 2005, only 15 
percent of the total population was covered by the pension and insurance system.  
Nevertheless, despite the undeniable effectiveness of the growth process, the capitalization 
and profitability of banks have been a source of some concern. For example, the ratio of capital 
to assets of China‘s four largest banks fell from 12.1 percent in 1985 to 2.2 percent in 1996, 
with profitability relatively stable at about 1.4 percent in 1985–1987 but falling sharply since. 
Although the reported profitability of Chinese banks during the 1990s compared reasonably 
well with that of major international banks in the mid-1980s, by the mid-1990s, their returns 
were well below those of banks of comparable size in market economies (Lardy, 1998). This 
context opened the door successive monetary and financial reforms since the mid-1990s.  
In recent years, the Chinese government has taken active measures while treading a fine 
line between strengthening the effectiveness of the banking sector and not damaging the 
government's economic growth targets. According to Xinghai (2001), its many financial 
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sector reforms since 1995 include centralizing government control of insurance companies and 
stock exchanges, setting up policy banks, forcing the collectivization of urban credit unions, 
abolishing loan quotas, and establishing asset management companies (AMCs) to deal with 
nonperforming loans. Additionally, to redress some of the financial damage done to the banks 
during their days of policy-driven lending, in 1999 it set up an AMC for each of the Big Four 
banks to reduce its NPL level. After initially taking on NPLs worth RMB 1.4 trillion ($169 
billion), these AMCs have since slowly sold or auctioned off some of these distressed assets 
(Thomas and Ji, 2007). In 2003, the government established the Central Huijin Investment Co., 
Ltd. (Huijin), a wholly owned government investment company that funnels foreign exchange 
instead of the RMB bonds used in previous recapitalizations. By 2005, government capital 
spending on both NPL reduction and capital infusion into the Big Four banks reached roughly 
$250 billion, although at the end of 2005, the NPLs of all Chinese commercial banks still 
amounted to about eight percent of China‘s 2005 GDP.  
Following the 1995 Commercial Banking Law (CBL), which emphasized the need for 
financial institutions to incorporate commercial criteria into their lending practices and allowed 
the remaining SOBs to concentrate on more commercially oriented lending, the banking system 
overall improved in asset quality, capital adequacy, and capacity to withstand risk (Li, 2004). 
The late 1990s also saw the emergence of institutional investors. In addition, since 1996, when 
foreign institutional investors were allowed to invest in Chinese banks, 35 overseas banks have 
acquired stakes in 23 Chinese banks, with investments worth $21 billion (Xinhua, 2007). 
The most significant event for China‘s financial system in the 1990s was the inception and 
fast growth of the Chinese stock market after the establishment of the two domestic stock 
exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) in 1990. In 1995, the total market capitalization of the stock 
market as a percentage of GDP was about 6 percent, which rose rapidly to 19 percent in 2005. 
By the end of 2005, 1,381 companies were listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges (Bai, 2006). The Hong Kong Stock Exchange has also contributed much of the 
inward equity portfolio investment via the H shares, and since 2002, foreign investors have also 
been allowed to invest in A shares, albeit subject to many restrictions.  
In addition, since the establishment of the first mutual fund in 1998, participation by 
foreign investors in China‘s stock market has increased significantly, with inward equity 
portfolio investment increasing from US$849 million in 2001 to US$20.3 billion in 2005 (Allen 
et al. 2005). In June 2004, a fully electronically operated or ―second-tier‖ market similar to the 
NASDAQ was begun for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), on which 119 firms were listed 
by the end of February 2007. A ―third-tier market‖ was also established to deal primarily with 
de-listing firms and other over-the-counter (OTC) products (Allen et al. 2005). Nevertheless, 
compared with developed economies, the Chinese financial market is still lacking in product 
variety and sophistication. 
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Since 1998, China‘s bond market has also been growing at an annual compound rate of over 
30 percent, but most of this growth is a result of the expansionary fiscal policy before 2004 and 
large bill issuance by the central bank for monetary sterilization purpose. Most Chinese bonds 
are issued by the government and government-owned policy banks, while the corporate bond 
market remains very small, especially relative to the large amount of bank credit to private firms. 
As of November 2005, the shares of government bonds, PBOC bills, and the financial bonds of 
the three policy banks were 37 percent, 32 percent, and 27 percent, respectively, but corporate 
bonds and commercial papers (regulated by the PBOC) only accounted for about two percent 
each (Ji, 2006).  
Besides the bond market, new types of markets have also emerged, including futures 
markets whose development has led to improvement in price discoveries for a wide range of 
commodities, including industrial raw materials and farm produce. This development has 
contributed to stabilization of the spot market and minimization of the possible impact on 
consumers of sharp price swings. In December 2006, as part of its WTO commitments, the 
government also granted foreign financial institutions full operations in the domestic market, 
effective from April 2007, although the CBRC reserves the right to ―moderately‖ adjust its 
limitations on foreign investment in Chinese financial institutions ―at the right time‖ and give 
preference to overseas banks that want to set up branches in central and western China. By the 
end of October, more than 90 overseas banks had operations on the Chinese mainland, running 
about 230 branches (Xinhua, 2007). Since then, foreign banks have seen their business steadily 
increase, with overseas banks posting outstanding loans of $88.8 billion, up 57.8 percent, and 
deposits rising 38.4 percent to $50.9 billion.  
Although the above reforms and financial system development have taken place amid 
sustained economic growth and without macroeconomic disturbance, the performance of the 
Chinese financial system has been constantly questioned; most particularly, because the 
definition, measurement, and evaluation of performance varies according to the yardstick used. 
Consequently, evaluations of the Chinese financial system‘s performance range from an 
extremely favorable assessment by those emphasizing rates of GDP growth, rising financial 
depth, and the rapid growth of new private institutions to a very unfavorable evaluation by those 
whose ideology of market fundamentalism tends to favor short-term profitability (Angresano, 
2005) to the exclusion of alternative interpretations. 
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3. Chinese financial development: reinterpretation 
To put the above realities into perspective, this section discusses the goals and effectiveness 
of the Chinese financial system and justifies selected policy choices made by the authorities. 
3.1. Financial and monetary policies 
The ultimate goal of monetary and financial policy is to achieve a particular growth rate 
with the minimum macroeconomic disturbance possible. Thus, authorities often use financial 
policies to affect the opportunity costs of external finance. In this respect, to meet its 
development goals, the Chinese government has supported particular activities by controlling 
interest rates and sectoral credit allocation together with its long practice of a prudent monetary 
policy (although it is now considering a shift to a tight policy aimed at preventing the 
overheating and inflation of economic growth). 
Even though the Central Bank Law instituted the People‘s Bank of China (PBOC) as a 
monetary policy implementer and financial institution supervisor, the PBOC is not an 
independent entity like the European Central Bank or the Bank of Japan. Rather, the 
development of new financial products and determination of the interest rates on loans remain 
subject to government control in order to ensure both compatibility with other development 
policies and financial system stability. Moreover, in contrast to the U.S. or Japanese central 
banks‘ focus on inflation, the Chinese central bank has concentrated on reallocating loanable 
funds from regions of high to low growth and has continued to rely on administered interest 
rates. Thus, in China, the central bank is not independent from the government bureaucracy and 
serves as a developmental institution rather than as part of market institutions. 
Although such controls over the price and financial sector may appear a less desirable 
policy stance, related policies implemented by Chinese authorities have proven effective in 
ensuring domestic financial stability and external shock immunity. For instance, by keeping the 
entire financial system under control, financial policies have prevented the Chinese financial 
institutions from taking up risks (like foreign currency risk or some derivative risks) that could 
have led to the type of sudden collapse that affected most of East Asia during the 1997–98 
financial crisis (Xinghai, 2001). The only partial convertibility of the RMB (limited on the 
current account but not on capital account transactions) made it far less vulnerable to 
speculative attacks.  
Moreover, China abandoned the credit plan in 1998 and has since progressively introduced 
instruments for indirect monetary control through mainly open market operations. As a result of 
these steps, together with the development of interbank markets, the liquidity of banks and other 
financial institutions has improved (Wang, 2000). Nevertheless, despite the emergence of 
instruments for indirect monetary policy, the authorities have remained cautious about the risks 
of any financial instability that could erode monetary policy effectiveness while imposing heavy 
costs on taxpayers and disrupting the real economy through reduced availability of credit and other 
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services like payments (Goldstein and Turner, 1996).  
Equally important, direct monetary policy instruments have contributed in creating 
opportunities for profitable and stable economic environment in other sectors. Thus, even 
though proponents of financial repression theory cite controlled interest rates as one tool of 
financial repression, China‘s financial policies have actually provided positive rather than the 
theoretically expected negative outcomes. First, monetary and financial policies have produced 
high saving rates rather than the opposite (as predicted by related theories). On these grounds, 
even McKinnon (1994), a leading figure in financial repression theory, implicitly recognizes the 
necessity to resort to financial restraint policies given that China‘s interest rate policy, 
particularly on saving deposits, remains very important to preserving the incentives of 
households and enterprises to build up their financial asset positions. Despite the merits of a 
market economy, recent economic growth theories (especially endogenous growth) recognize 
that selected types of government spending are economically efficient (see Barro and 
Sala-i-martin, 1999; Aghion and Williamson, 1998), those include market enhancing policies 
known as ―financial restraint policies (Stiglitz, 1993; Hellmann, 1997). Through financial 
restraint policies (such as entry restrictions, credit allocation), the Chinese government has been 
creating rent opportunities to provide banks with efficient incentive to invest in deposit 
mobilization.  
Second, except during very short episodes of inflation (from 1988 to 1990 and from 1993 
through April 1996), Chinese authorities have been successful in maintaining a positive deposit 
rate in real terms by, for instance, instituting the so-called value-guarantee deposits (which were 
designed to insulate long-term deposits from inflation). Third, since Chinese SOBs have 
generally held reserves in excess of requirements (Girardin, 1997), an increase in the reserve 
requirement may not actually lead to an increased level of financial repression through a 
reduction in the overall level of SOB intermediation. Additionally, since a number of financial 
institutions have failed to reach the eight percent capital adequacy ratio, the differentiated 
required reserve ratio scheme is conducive to curbing excessive credit expansion of those 
financial institutions having a low capital adequacy ratio and poor asset quality (Wu, 2004).  
What the above discussion illustrates once again is that, in many respects, the policies 
implemented by the Chinese authorities can be interpreted as necessary financial restraint 
measures (like directed and sectoral credit allocation) rather than financial repression (as 
defined in McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Indeed, under the above conditions, it appears that, in 
contrast to the market speculative-focused view in which capital is distantly linked to the means 
of production while being associated with frequent financial instabilities, for a transition or 
developing economy, the preference for a controlled banking system is important.  
In general, policies and reforms, either monetary or financial, are effective if they 
coherently fit into economic growth strategies. In this respect, China has embarked on an 
export-led growth orientation with the result of a continuous building up of foreign exchange 
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reserve. Because of the peg ratio of the RMB to the $US, the People‘s Bank of China (PBC) has 
had to buy up dollars (i.e., supply the RMB) in order to withdraw excess liquidity by selling 
securities primarily to state-owned banks. This sterilization process means upward pressure on 
interest rates, which if allowed to increase would attract additional capital inflows. The PBC 
thus has an incentive to control interest rates and, since that cannot suffice, must also shape the 
rules of financial interactions by relying on administrative means to manage money and credit 
growth. 
Again, the argument here is rather that in the case of China, policies such as credit 
allocation and controlled interest rates extend far beyond the mere State intervention 
emphasized
 
by neoclassical economics. They might have facilitated co-evolutionary fitness 
within the finance-growth nexus. As such, monetary and financial intervention policies in China 
might have played ‗a more creative role by allowing private agents to satisfy individually or 
collectively certain goals unattainable through market forces
 
alone‘ (Moreau, 2004). 
To date, then, China‘s monetary and financial policies have been effective in ensuring 
economic growth and macroeconomic stability; which provides a preliminary indication of 
financial policy coherence and effectiveness with economic growth and development goals. 
Therefore, any credible evaluation of financial system and its development in such a setting 
only makes sense in terms of policy coherence with the country‘s developmental goals. 
3.2. Development goals and adaptive efficiency 
The objective of a an SOB in a developing or a transition economy is to maximize the 
developmental impact (i.e. social return) of lending subject to the condition that its operations 
remain solvent and/or bail-out by the state is guaranteed. In the case of China, the role of 
state-owned banks, specifically, is to bankroll the government's massive infrastructure projects 
and to keep state-owned enterprises that would otherwise be bankrupt afloat. Also, Chinese 
authorities regarded directed-loans (most of which generated the NPLs) as a means for reducing 
regional disparities (Park and Sehrt, 2001). That is, it uses the financial system, especially the 
state banking sector, to provide preferential credit treatment to provinces with a lower level of 
economic development (Chen, 2003).  
Clearly, the above loan distribution differs from the optimum distribution according to 
market economic theories. Even after subsequent reforms, most Chinese banks are still not 
profit centers (but rather extended public service institutions) and tend to subordinate financial 
performance to development purpose, thereby privileging the preservation of the entire system 
over mere corporate profit. That is why unprofitable state-owned enterprises account for 25 
percent of gross domestic product but receive 65 percent of loans (Vardy, 2007). In that context, 
the relevance of allocative efficiency criteria appears to be questionable. Hence, for the financial 
inefficiency argument to be valid, one could think of a factor that leaves the Chinese real sector 
unaffected by its poor financial system. While it may seem natural to argue that FDI can represent 
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such a factor, yet the argument by Alfaro et al. (2004) shows that the country's capacity to take 
advantage of these externalities (FDI) depends on local conditions, especially the domestic financial 
system. These inefficiencies—as manifested through NPL and directed credit allocation—may 
have been keys in building up the required spillovers without which, after all, financial 
intermediation would not have facilitated economic growth.  
The economy is a series of linked markets. FDI inflows energize thus other sectors through 
positive and negative externalities. When the attention is focused upon the spillovers, it is clear 
than economic growth could be achieved with the effects of positive externalities being larger 
than the negative ones. Nonexcludability and nondiminshability, properties of a public good that 
are inherent in the classic state-owned enterprise, create externalities that impair economy-wide 
economic efficiency. (Jefferson, 1998). 
Although the levels of NPLs in the SOBs are high by the standards of industrial economies, 
two circumstances make this issue of less dramatic concern. First, to induce lending to state 
enterprises—a political objective to support employment—banks receive a government subsidy 
in the form of an ex-post bailout. Second, the Chinese government does not carry a large 
amount of debt: total outstanding government bonds have only grown from nine percent of the 
GDP in 1998 to around 16 percent of the GDP in 2005. In contrast, countries such as the U.S. 
and India have a large amount of government debt even though their banking sectors are healthy 
as measured by low levels of NPLs (Allen, et al., 2007). Therefore, in the institutional context 
of China, there can be no theoretical presumption that credit has been sub-optimally allocated or 
that SOBs should have focused on financial returns.  
The exclusive use of financial measures to gauge the performance of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and SOBs is also inappropriate in that these institutions are trying to satisfy a 
broad range of objectives (economic development and social objectives) in contrast to firms and 
banks in a purely market economy that are attempting solely to maximize profits. Thus, in the 
case of China, interpreting the lower allocative efficiency in SOB lending as inefficiency is 
misleading (Laurenceson and Chai, 2003) because it has long been recognized that projects 
having great development significance may only yield a marginal financial return. That is, due 
to the existence of market failures, there is often a large divergence between social and private 
returns to lending. Rather, the presence of institutional complementarity implies that, even if a 
system can be identified that has the best components; it is not necessarily the best system 
(Holzl, 2006). 
Moreover, what the market might view as inefficient may simply reflect a commitment by 
many SOE managers and workers to facilitate a gradual transition to the private sector 
(Angresano, 2005). That is, even though the decision to retain inefficient, large SOEs may 
appear economically irrational, China has actually lowered the social costs of reform by making 
a conscious decision to endure some inefficiency in order to maintain higher employment levels 
and corresponding political and social stability (Oi, 1999). Through such a tradeoff, it has thus 
 13 
avoided any dramatic collapse in the SOE‘s output. Clearly, the key to continuing good 
economic performance might have been a flexible institutional matrix in which financial system 
has been inseparably part of. In this respect, measuring the amount that each part separetly 
contributes to the value created by the whole is trivial. Such a perspective in turn implies a 
complex and evolving economic system. Hence, there are good reasons to view the Chinese 
financial sector as an evolutionary sub-system insofar as it has been capable of organizing a web 
of specific investment around one or more critical resources linked inextricably to the best 
growth opportunities (Sun, 2002). 
It follows from the above that, rather than allocative efficiency, the relevant criterion should 
be the ‗adaptive efficiency‘ defined, by North (1993), as the capacity to develop institutions that 
offer a stable framework for economic activity. Adaptive efficiency is needed since the aim of 
financial institutions is to improve a given situation according to developmental goals and not to 
mazimize any optimal profit or financial return. From the characteristic that the whole of a 
complex adaptive system is greater than the sum of its parts, it can be postulated that in the 
process of channeling fund to firms, a growth-enabling dynamic emerges that creates a whole 
greater than the sum of the parts. In essence, individual bank does not have to be profitable 
(since that is not their assigned mission anyway); it is the spillovers --generated by interactions 
between those financial institutions-- that are responsible for the persistence of the financial 
system‘s fitness and the emergence of a strong economic growth. It appears thus that much of 
what critics cite as intermediation inefficiencies –non performing loans, directed credit 
allocation– are, in fact, a dissipative energy generating the required spillovers that fuel the entire 
system. 
In general, financial markets face permanent dilemmas between efficiency and evolutionary 
viability—defined here as the probability that some innovation will emerge at a future time that 
will turn out to be fitter in the new environment (Dosi, 1990). Financial systems also differ in 
the ways they seemingly trade off ―static efficiency‖ for ―evolutionary viability,‖ as well as in 
the apparent success of such tradeoffs. Admittedly, in some instances certain tradeoffs become 
inevitable in order to ensure institutional coherence (fitness or evolutionary viability, as in Dosi, 
1990). As Darwin points out, plants and animals evolve over time, and the survival of the 
individual and of the species as a whole depends on how well it fits with its environment. 
Nevertheless, such survival of the fittest does not mean ―survival of the one that takes the most 
exercise‖; rather, it means survival of the species that best adapts to its surroundings. The same 
logic applies to financial institutions. It is not only efficiency that makes a financial institution 
intrinsically relevant but how well that institution matches or fits the economic environment and 
overall development goals.  
In addition, in a coevolutionary process, the adaptive landscape of one sector heaves and 
deforms as the other sectors make their own adaptive moves (Kauffman, 1992). Thus, in a 
rapidly changing economic environment such as that of China, the coevolving financial system 
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is in no way limited to primarily attaining market efficiency. Rather, the workability of the 
financial system depends on its different elements fitting together: the system can be considered 
consistent insofar as its complementary elements take on values that lead to an optimum, even 
though such an optimum need not be the most efficient. Had Chinese authorities privileged 
financial return (allocative efficiency) from the start, as did their Russian counterparts, for 
instance, the macroeconomic system would have collapsed with incalculable economic and 
socio-political consequences.  
All things considered, while recognizing the validity of some alleged inefficiencies inherent 
in the Chinese financial system, it is clear that the Chinese financial system, dominated by 
state-owned banks, has shown fitness with economic growth and development goals along the 
country‘s transitional path. Sustained economic growth and high social return could not have 
been achieved if the financial system were inefficient or inadequate.  
The above described macroeconomic success does not, however, lead to the dismissal of the 
importance of allocative efficiency criterion, whose desirable economical properties are more 
relevant in a market or mature economy, a developmental stage that China has clearly not yet 
attained. Furthermore, as in any adaptive system, past performance does not ensure future 
systemic fitness. Rather, as economic growth proceeds, there is sufficient reason to continuously 
reinvent and adapt the Chinese financial system to fit with its entire economic environment. 
Therefore, the focus should be on ensuring that the financial system continues to fit the 
economic growth and development targets. 
4. Conclusion and Final Reflections 
The essay aimed at providing a better conceptual interpretation of theoretical and empirical 
studies on Chinese financial development while searching for alternative criteria (other than 
allocative efficiency) in understanding its transitional financial system. Economic theories 
predict that efficient financial system facilitates economic growth while inefficient one inhibits 
growth. Yet, it is difficult to reconcile empirical facts about China‘s economic growth outcomes 
with reasonable assumptions about the efficient and liberalized financial intermediation, posing 
difficulties for financial reform policies. Using an evolutionary perspective as a metaphor, this 
essay offered suggestions that adaptive efficiency criterion offers conceptual as well as 
methodological approaches to resolving the above contradiction.  
Conceptually, the essay traced the development of China‘s financial system in its 
interactions with the country‘s macroeconomic and development goals. Making the financial 
system part of a complex adaptive system reconciles many of the apparent puzzle since, for 
instance, the wasted resources are not lost at the macro-systemic level as evidenced by the 
sustained high economic growth. Such an outcome ultimately suggests that much of what critics 
cite as intermediation inefficiencies –non performing loans, directed credit allocation– are, in 
fact, a dissipative energy generating the required spillovers that fuel the entire system.  
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Methodologically, the argument in this essay alarm at the growing disconnect between the 
verdict emerging from transition economies such China and financial development theories. The 
essay goes thus to offer suggestions to develop a better understanding of the coevolution of 
financial and economic growth by exploring the various evolutionary features such as indicators 
of adaptive efficiency and dissipative spillovers. Even though the measurement and proxies for 
adaptive efficiency have not yet been fully articulated within a rigorous quantitative framework, 
they present researchers with an opportunity to generate new insights. Specifically, future 
studies need to investigate the effectiveness or fitness patterns in the pertinent time series data 
resorting to available econometrics tools. For instance, evidence of bi-directional Granger 
causality can be taken as a preliminary indication for the presence of a coevolutionary pattern. 
Ultimately, an evolutionary perspective combined with endogenous growth models is likely to 
reconcile many of the apparent contradictions in the finance-growth nexus in transition 
economies. 
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